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Abstract
This paper investigates the performance of early warning systems for currency crises
in real-time, using forecasts of indicators that are available at the moment predic-
tions are to be made. We investigate two types of commonly used early warning
systems for currency crises: the signal approach and the logit model. We apply each
EWS to a panel of fifteen emerging economies, distinguishing an estimation period
1991Q1–2010Q4 and a prediction period 2011Q1–2017Q4. We find that using indi-
cator forecasts in the predictions worsens the ability of early warning systems to
signal crises compared to the most recently available information.
Keywords Real time data · Early warning system · Currency crises ·
Signal approach · Logit model · Emerging economies
JEL Classiﬁcation F31 · E47 · G01 · C23 · E58
1 Introduction
The high costs of financial crises for the public sector as well as private investors
has led to a large number of empirical studies that intend to detect crises in a timely
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manner, such that a crisis can be avoided, or its impact can be mitigated. Typically
Early Warning Systems (EWSs) are employed for this purpose, these are quantitative
models that predict extreme events based on statistical information and mechanisms
from the past. For overviews see Kaminsky et al. (1998) or Abiad (2003).1
EWSs for financial crises have been criticized for several reasons, one of which is
that they are only useful for detecting past crises (Frankel and Saravelos 2010). An
important reason is that the data used by forecasters to construct the EWS are not
available in a timely manner. Also indicators are selected with the benefit of hind-
sight.2 EWSs are typically tested out-of-sample using the most recent data, known
as current-vintage data. When the EWS detects crises using current-vintage data but
fails to detect crises for the out-of-sample prediction period, then the EWS provides
a false sense of security.
We focus on a particular type of financial crisis, the currency crisis, which is
defined as a large, sudden depreciation or devaluation of the exchange rate, or an
episode with high pressure on the exchange rate that may result in large losses of
international reserves and/or a hike in domestic interest rates to defend the exchange
rate (Berg et al. 2005). Currency crises not only occur in countries with fixed
exchange rate regimes, but also in countries with flexible exchange rates which, in
principle, should be more resistant to currency crises. One would expect continuous
market adjustment to limit the buildup of pressures leading to extreme currency over-
valuation and subsequent large discrete currency declines as may occur under fixed
exchange rate regimes. Pegged and intermediate exchange rate regimes are indeed
associated with greater susceptibility to currency crises, particularly in developing
and emerging market countries with more open capital accounts (Ghosh et al. 2010).
However, many countries with floating exchange rates have experienced currency
crises. A possible explanation is the fact that countries reporting their currencies as
floating are often quite reluctant to allow their currencies to float due to so-called
fear of floating behavior (Calvo and Reinhart 2000), and de facto follow a pegged
exchange rate regime (Glick and Hutchison 2011).
In this paper, we investigate the performance of EWSs for currency crises with
real-time data, which reflects the notion that data (indicators and forecasts) are sub-
ject to revisions in the course of time. We assess the sensitivity of EWS currency
crisis predictions to the choice of two alternative data sets. As our first data set, we
employ current-vintage data which implies using information of the most recent vin-
tage. The second data set that we employ contains real-time indicator forecasts, for
this we convert annual forecasts for period t published in the beginning of the period
t in quarterly forecasts, for details see Section 3.2 below.
1EWSs are not only applied to predict financial crises, but also for natural disasters such as tsunamis,
earthquakes, droughts and epidemics (Choo 2009).
2Other reasons are that the out-of-sample performance of EWSs has been rather poor—even for prominent
papers (Berg and Pattillo 1999). A more fundamental problem with early warning signals is that these
are meant to predict crises with the aim to avoid their occurrence; but if these signals are used for policy
purposes, the predicted crises will be avoided, which means that model predictions will not be accurate
any longer. Bussie`re (2013) refers to this contradiction as an “impossibility theorem”. A second problem
is similar in essence, but leads to the opposite conclusion: when Early Warning Systems predict a crisis
this may lead to self-fulfilling prophecies by market participants.
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We investigate two types of commonly used early warning systems for currency
crises: the signal approach and the logit model. We apply each EWS to a panel of 15
countries, five from Latin America, five from Asia, and five from Central and East-
ern Europe, in the period 1991–2017, employing data on a quarterly frequency. We
estimate our EWSs on the in-sample period (1991Q1–2010Q4), using 10–15 eco-
nomic and financial indicators that correspond to different generations of currency
crises (Kaminsky 2006; see also e.g. Zhao et al. 2014, Section 2.1) and are typi-
cally employed in studies on EWSs for currency crises. Then we predict currency
crises for the out-of-sample period (2011Q1–2017Q4) with two types of real-time
data explained above.
To review the performance of alternative EWSs on forecasting currency crises in
emerging economies in the late 1990s Berg et al. (2005) use only information that
was available at the time. No information about actual outcomes is used in the fore-
casts. They use the internal IMF July 1999 forecasts and subsequent internal forecasts
to compare the performance of alternative EWSs. Gunther and Moore (2003) com-
pare the performance of an EWS for banking crises in the period 1996–1998 using
first releases (first official publication of the data after the period has ended) ver-
sus current-vintage data that was available in May 2000 and find that the EWS with
current-vintage data performs better than the EWS with first releases. Reagle and
Salvatore (2005) test the robustness of predicting the Asian 1997–1998 financial cri-
sis without and with data revisions. They estimate a probit model for a cross-section
of a group of 54 emerging economies with three sets of data: the original, unrevised
1996 World Bank data, and the 1999 and 2004 updates of the 1996 World Bank data.
They conclude that data revisions lead to significant changes in the model’s estimates,
which presents a problem for researchers that should be recognized and addressed.
The importance of using early estimates in EWSs has been acknowledged in
the literature, but real-time data have not been implemented on a widespread scale.
Frankel and Saravelos (2012) comment that predictions issued in real-time would be
impressive, but also especially difficult. Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013) remark that
real-time data sets that contain information on the revisions of data after the first
publication do not exist yet for several countries in their sample of developed and
emerging economies. Data availability issues seem to be the major reason why imple-
mentation has not been widespread; early estimates for emerging economies are not
publicly available.
Alessi and Detken (2011) use quasi real-time data. Although it sounds similar to
real-time data, the authors actually mean current-vintage data. In their words:
The caveat is that we use the most recent vintage of data and not a true real
time data set with unrevised data. Nevertheless, we use conservative lags to
proxy for standard publication lags and thus real time data availability. [...] The
performance of real variables could possibly be worse in a true real time setting
compared to a quasi real time setting, as real variables can be heavily revised
(i.e., the quality of current-vintage data can be much better than the quality of
real-time vintages). [page 524]
Lo Duca and Peltonen (2013) also use quasi real-time data, in their case to pre-
dict financial stress events. Holopainen and Sarlin (2016) use quasi real-time data to
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predict banking crises. Their contribution to the crises EWS literature is to assume
that the forecaster uses all available accounting and market-based information with
a lag.
Our approach differs from Berg et al. (2005) in several ways. First, we explicitly
focus on the difference between indicator forecasts and current-vintage data when
making out-of-sample predictions. Second, we use the consensus forecasts of Haver
Analytics, whereas they use internal predictions from the IMF, which are not publicly
available. Third, we consider a longer period. As a consequence, our sample includes
more and different currency crises, both from the 1990s (e.g. Mexico 1994-1995,
Russia 1998, Brazil 1999) and the next decade (e.g. Argentina 2001–2002, and the
Global Financial Crisis that hit most emerging economies in 2008–2009). Including
more crises makes our analysis more complete, because of the variety in the crises
(Kaminsky 2006). In contrast to Gunther and Moore (2003) and Reagle and Salva-
tore (2005) we use forecasts of indicators to predict currency crises whereas they
focus on first releases of indicators to predict banking crises. Similar to Reagle and
Salvatore (2000, 2005) we use panel data, but they estimate a probit model using
cross-sections. Panel data have advantages over cross sections and time series, in
particular increased sample variation and accommodating unobserved heterogeneity
through fixed effects.
Our results can be useful for policymakers as attention is drawn to the issue of
data availability. Since current-vintage data is not available when predictions have to
be made, a realistic out-of-sample evaluation of EWSs requires early estimates (i.e.,
forecasts) of the indicators. Our results show that crisis prediction results are worse
when using early estimates.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the two
types of EWSs we employ in this paper. After the description of the data in Section 3,
we present and discuss the empirical results in Sections 4 and 5. Section 6 concludes.
2 Methodology
This section introduces two of the most widely used types of EWSs to predict cur-
rency crises, the signal approach and the discrete choice model.3 The final subsection
shows how we compare the out-of-sample currency crisis prediction performance
using current-vintage data and using indicator forecasts.
2.1 Signal Approach
Eichengreen et al. (1995) and Frankel and Rose (1996) introduce event study graphs
to analyze and predict currency crises. The method involves a graphical comparison
of the performance of indicators in times of crisis versus their performance in tranquil
3Recent alternatives use multivariate extreme value theory (Cumperayot and Kouwenberg 2013) or artifi-
cial neural works Sevim et al. (2014). In the paper we do not focus on obtaining the best EWS in terms of
currency crisis prediction.
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periods. Kaminsky et al. (1998) extend this methodology to what is known as the sig-
nal approach. This approach consists of two stages. In the first stage the indicators
that are expected to play a role in the crisis, such as inflation, debt as a percentage
of GDP and the current account, are selected. Typically, a visual inspection of the
event study graph determines whether the indicator shows a special, extraordinary
behavior before a crisis. This helps to restrict the number of potential crisis indica-
tors. In the second stage a threshold is determined for each indicator by minimizing
the probability of not signalling a crisis that occurred (type I error) and the proba-
bility of signalling a crisis that did not occur (type II error). If the variable exceeds
a pre-established threshold, then a crisis is signaled and the value of 1 is assigned to
the binary crisis variable, and zero otherwise. For each threshold we construct a con-
tingency table as in Table 1. A represents the number of observations in which the
model signals a crisis that actually took place (correct crisis signals); B corresponds
to the number of observations in which the model signals a crisis that did not take
place (false alarms, also known as type II errors); C is the number of observations
in which the model does not signal a crisis that actually took place (missed crises,
a.k.a type I errors); and D is the number of observations in which the model does not
signal a crisis that did not take place (correct non-crisis signals).
The main advantages of the signal approach are that the method does not impose
any parametric structure on the data, and that the method is more accessible and
informative than tables of coefficient estimates. The main disadvantage is that the
approach is intrinsically univariate as we analyze the individual contribution instead
of the marginal contribution conditional on other variables (Frankel and Rose 1996).
The optimal threshold depends on the relative costs of the two error types. Bussie`re
and Fratzscher (2006) consider type II errors less worrisome from a policy-maker’s
perspective for two reasons. First, type II errors (false alarms) tend to be less costly
from a welfare perspective than type I errors (missed crises). The costs of a false
alarm are the costs of taking preventive actions, the risk of a self-fulfilling prophecy,
and the loss of trust in the policy makers when false alarms become frequent. How-
ever, missing a crisis (which possibly could have been prevented or the effect of
which could have been lowered by pre-emptive policies) has often a higher welfare
cost. For instance, the high cost of financial crises have manifested themselves in
the form of large output contractions, rising unemployment and poverty rates among
many affected emerging markets in the 1990s (Rewilak 2018). Second, false alarms
may not always be due to the predictive failure of the model, but simply reflect the
fact that although fundamentals indeed indicate vulnerabilities in the country’s eco-
nomic situation, appropriate policy initiatives were taken to improve the resilience of
the economy and prevent a crisis (Bussie`re and Fratzscher 2006).
Table 1 Contingency table of
crisis realizations and signals Realization
Signal Crisis No crisis
Crisis A B
No crisis C D
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There are several ways to determine the optimal threshold. We use the Total Mis-
specification Error and the Noise to Signal ratio.4 The letters (A, B, C, D) used in
the formulas below refer to the categories distinguished in Table 1.
2.1.1 Total Misspeciﬁcation Error
The Total Misspecification Error (TME) is the sum of the probabilities of type I and
type II errors:
T ME = C
A + C +
B
B + D . (1)
The lower the T ME, the better the variable identifies the actual crisis. Since the
number of crises (A + C) is very low compared to the number of tranquil periods
(B + D), the measure implicitly values a lower number of missed crisis more than a
lower number of false alarms.
2.1.2 Noise to Signal Ratio
The noise-to-signal (NtS) ratio is used in the original signal approach study of
Kaminsky et al. (1998) and defined as:
NtS = B/(B + D)
A/(A + C) . (2)
The lower the NtS, the better the variable identifies the actual crisis. Indicators with
an NtS equal to or greater than 1 should be discarded, since these do not have intrin-
sic predicting power. According to this criterion false alarms and missed crises are
treated with equal weights.
2.2 Discrete Choice Models
Logit and probit models are widely used in EWSs for financial crises, including
currency crises. Compared to the signal approach, the logit and probit models have
advantages. First, the methods consider all the indicators simultaneously (Kaminsky
et al. 1998), and second, the independent variables can have a nonlinear effect on
the probability of a crisis, which is appropriate because of the presence of strong
nonlinear effects in currency crises mechanisms (Bussie`re 2007).
In the binary logit model the dependent variable is dichotomous and takes the
value of 1 if the event occurs and 0 otherwise. In this setup, Yit represents a binary
variable for country i ∈ {1, . . . , N} at time t ∈ {1, . . . , Ti} where Ti denotes the
number of time periods considered for the ith country. The probability of an event is
4We also applied the loss function a` la Alessi and Detken (2011) and the Receiver Operating Characteristic
(ROC) curve methodology. In both methods a grid search is made, for increasing cost of type I errors
(missed crises) relative to type II errors (false alarms). When the cost of type I errors is relatively high, then
both the loss-function and the ROC curve methods yield the same thresholds as the Total Misspecification
Error. When the cost is relatively low, then both methods yield the same thresholds as the Noise to Signal
ratio. Results are available upon request.
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characterized by the logistic distribution. That is, for each country, the probability of
the event is given by:
P(Yit = 1) = exp(Xitβ)
1 + exp(Xitβ) , i = 1, . . . , N; (3)
where Xit denotes a vector of exogenous variables and β the vector of slope
parameters.5
The odds ratio, which is useful for interpretations, is determined as
P(Yit = 1)
1 − P(Yit = 1) = exp(Xitβ). (4)
A common alternative for discrete choice models is the probit model. In this paper
we prefer the logit model because crises events do not occur often (as is the case
in currency crises and sovereign debt crises). The logistic distribution (logit model)
has heavier tails than the normal distribution (probit model) (Manasse et al. 2003;
Bussie`re 2007). However, out-of-sample performances are broadly similar (Comelli
2014).
2.3 Out-of-Sample Performance
We estimate early warning systems for the period 1991Q1–2010Q4, with current-
vintage data. Then we compare its out-of-sample prediction for the period 2011Q1–
2017Q4, with (i) current-vintage data, and (ii) real-time indicator forecasts. We
include the currency crises that occur in the second half of 2008 (after the fall of
Lehmann Brothers) in the in-sample period, because this crisis has elements not
seen in earlier crises such as the involvement of advanced economies. Moreover, this
choice increases the number of crisis observations in the estimation period. Accord-
ing to Frankel and Saravelos (2012) leading indicators that most frequently appeared
in earlier reviews are not statistically significant in the Global Financial Crisis.
2.3.1 Measures for the Out-of-Sample Performance
The methods to determine the optimal threshold, the Total Misspecification Error or
loss function approach (see Section 2.1), can also be used to measure the out-of-
sample performance of the signal approach and the binary logit model. For the logit
model an additional measure is available which is the quadratic probability score
(QPS) proposed by Diebold and Rudebusch (1989) to evaluate out-of-sample fore-
casts. This measure indicates how close, on average, the predicted probabilities Pt






5In this paper we apply static logit models. Candelon et al. (2014) take the persistence of currency crises
into account, and set up dynamic logit and probit models by including lagged crises or indices in the set
of explanatory variables.
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The QPS ranges from 0 to 2, with a score of 0 corresponding to perfect accu-
racy (well-predicted crisis, or a well-predicted tranquil period), and a score of 2
corresponding to a perfect false signal (missed crisis or false alarm).
3 Data
We focus on emerging economies, in particular on three regions (Latin America,
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and Asia) for which real-time data, and notably
indicator forecasts, are available. Countries in these regions implemented market
reforms in the 1990s after a period of domestically-oriented economic policies. All
countries have experienced political and institutional changes, changes in exchange
rate regimes and at least one currency crisis since the early 1990s. For Latin Amer-
ica we select Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela. These countries
are the largest economies in terms of GDP and share economic and institutional fea-
tures, such as the importance of commodities, and a history of changes in exchange
rate regimes, and political and institutional changes. For CEE we take the five largest
economies in the region: Russia, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary and Ukraine.
Our sample is completed with the Asian countries Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia,
Philippines and Thailand.
We employ quarterly data. This higher frequency is recommended in early warn-
ing systems of currency crises, because a crisis often develops rapidly. There is a
complication though. Indicator forecasts are issued for the full current (calendar) year
and the following year. If we use the indicator forecast of the current year, then the
forecast in the first quarter is much more imprecise than the forecast in the fourth
quarter, which would introduce forecast bias. Therefore we follow Dovern et al.
(2012) and approximate fixed horizon forecasts as a weighted average of fixed event
forecasts. We calculate four-quarters ahead forecasts, by taking weighted averages of
these annual indicator forecasts. For example, the 2010Q3 forecast is calculated as
1/4 times the 2009 forecast of vintage 2009Q3 plus 3/4 times the 2010 forecast of
vintage 2009Q3. Table 2 illustrates our approach graphically.
3.1 Currency Crisis Dating
Our dating of currency crises is based on Boonman (2019), who constructs a database
with currency crisis dates by combining a broad range of quantitative definitions
with the narrative, other studies and expert opinions. A crisis exclusion period of
four quarters is implemented, which implies that a crisis that takes place within four
quarters after a previous crisis is not considered a separate crisis, but a continuation
of the previous crisis. We label the four quarters prior to the crisis as crisis run-up
period. This run-up period is employed since we are interested in an early warning
system, so we want to detect a currency crisis before it actually occurs.
The resulting currency crises are shown in Table 3. The third column of the
table shows that 33 currency crisis episodes occurred in the period 1991Q1–2010Q4.
Every country experienced at least one crisis. The last column shows there have been
nine currency crisis episodes in the out-of-sample period 2011Q1–2017Q4. Only
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Table 2 Real-time data trapezoid for quarterly frequency
Vintage quarters










· · · and so on
seven countries experienced a crisis in this episode. All crises are based on both
the exchange market pressure index and major currency depreciations, except the
2015Q3 crisis in Brazil which is based solely on large depreciations.
3.2 Explanatory Variables
As explanatory variables we use 10–15 economic and financial indicators that corre-
spond to different types of currency crises (Kaminsky 2006), and that are typically
used in studies on EWSs for currency crises. The explanatory variables can be divided
into three groups. The first group contains variables that are available for each coun-
try as forecasts for the out-of-sample period 2010Q1–2016Q4: real GDP growth,
inflation, exports growth, change in reserves, imports to reserves ratio, fiscal balance
to GDP, interest rate, external debt to GDP and current account balance to GDP.6
For each of these indicators we also use the change (both with respect to the previ-
ous quarter and the same quarter in the previous year). The second group consists of
global variables that capture external conditions. These variables are also available
as forecasts, but they are equal for each country in our panel. We use the USA as
a proxy for global conditions, and select US real GDP growth and the US Federal
funds rate to capture external conditions. The third group consists of country-specific
indicators that are not available as forecasts, but are nonetheless important to include
in an EWS for currency crises as control variables. We take these from current vin-
tage data: the cyclical component of domestic credit to GDP and the overvaluation or
undervaluation of the Real Exchange Rate. For both indicators we take the Hodrick-
Prescott filter with a smoothing parameter of 1600 to capture the long-run trend.
6Since the EWS has a run-up period of one year, the explanatory variables are lagged by four quarters.
This implies that for predicting crises in the out-of-sample period 2011Q1–2017Q4 one requires the data
on the explanatory variables for the period 2010Q1–2016Q4.
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Table 3 Identification of currency crises, 1991Q1–2017Q4
Country Starting In-sample Out-of-sample
year 1991Q1–2010Q4 2011Q1–2017Q4
Argentina 1992Q1 1995Q1, 2002Q1-2002Q2 2014Q1, 2015Q4-2016Q1
Brazil 1995Q1 1998Q4-1999Q1, 2002Q3, 2008Q4 2015Q3
Colombia 1991Q1 1998Q3, 2002Q4-2003Q1, 2008Q3-2008Q4 2015Q3
Mexico 1991Q1 1994Q4-1995Q3, 2008Q4-2009Q1
Venezuelaa 1991Q1 1994Q2, 1995Q4-1996Q2, 2002Q1-2003Q1, 2011Q1, 2013Q1
2010Q1
Turkey 1991Q1 1994Q1, 2001Q1, 2008Q4
Romania 1995Q1 1997Q1, 1999Q4
Poland 1992Q1 2008Q4-2009Q1
Russia 1995Q1 1998Q3-1998Q4, 2009Q1 2014Q4-2015Q1
Ukraine 1995Q1 1998Q3-1999Q1, 2008Q4 2014Q1-2015Q1
Philippines 1991Q1 1991Q1, 1997Q3-1997Q4, 2000Q4
Malaysia 1991Q1 1997Q3-1998Q1 2015Q3
Thailand 1991Q1 1997Q3-1998Q1
Indonesia 1991Q1 1997Q3-1998Q2, 2008Q4
Korea 1991Q1 1997Q4-1998Q1, 2008Q4
For the starting year we exclude years with hyperinflation, and years without available data
aDue to data issues we exclude the last two years. This implies that the crisis in 2016 is excluded
Data source: IFS
For the signal approach we only use variables from the first group, while for the logit
models we employ all variables.
The indicator forecasts are taken from the Focus Economic Consensus of Haver
Analytics (HA). The database offers monthly reported forecasts for economic indi-
cators. We take the value of the last month of the quarter as the quarterly observation.
Berkmen et al. (2012) use consensus growth forecast changes, which has the advan-
tage of pooling across various forecasters and potentially suffering from less bias.
For the same reason we prefer to use the consensus data from HA.
For the current-vintage data we use International Financial Statistics (IMF), Haver
Analytics and World Development Indicators, consulted in October 2018. Details on
the variables, their sources, frequency and availability are shown in Appendix A.
All explanatory variables have been standardized, using country-specific means and
standard deviations of the in-sample period (1991Q1-2010Q4).
4 Empirical Results
Since early warning systems are only useful when they issue an early warning sig-
nal, it is common to use indicators from period t − 1 to detect a possible crisis in
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period t . In other words, the model links the dependent variable (the crisis dummy)
to a selection of indicators from the period prior to the crisis entry on the dependent
variable (the crisis dummy). We assign a value of 1 to the crisis dummy for the four
quarters that precede the crisis start, and we exclude all the observations of the crisis
quarter(s) themselves, since the indicators typically show extreme behavior related
to the crisis.
4.1 Signal Approach
In the signal approach we determined the optimal threshold separately for each indi-
cator based on the in-sample period only using the lowest Total Misspecification
Error (TME) criterion. Most indicators enter in three forms, the level, change vis-a`-
vis the previous quarter, and the change vis-a`-vis the same quarter of the previous
year. We include each indicator in one form only, so that we have nine indicators. The
results are shown in Table 4. For each indicator we indicate whether a value below
(<) or above (>) the threshold signals a currency crisis, the contingency table and
outcomes of the TME and the Noise-to-Signal ratio.
According to the TME criterion, the best indicator to signal a currency crisis is
the quarterly change in the external debt to GDP as it has the lowest TME. It gives
Table 4 Signal Approach: In-sample results for nine indicators. Based on 15 countries, period 1991Q1 to
2010Q4
Indicators
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Crisis signal <0.1 >-0.5 <-0.5 <0.1 >0.2 <-0.1 >-0.8 >-0.1 <-0.1
A: True positive 80 115 48 98 64 79 114 99 83
B: False alarms 462 727 210 492 235 353 685 431 358
C: Missed crises 48 13 80 30 64 49 14 29 45
D: True negative 423 158 675 393 650 532 200 454 527
Prob type I (%) 37.5 10.2 62.5 23.4 50.0 38.3 10.9 22.7 35.2
Prob type II (%) 52.2 82.1 23.7 55.6 26.6 39.9 77.4 48.7 40.5
TME (%) 89.7 92.3 86.2 79.0 76.6 78.2 88.3 71.4 75.6
Noise-to-Signal (%) 83.5 91.4 63.3 72.6 53.1 64.6 86.9 63.0 62.4
Indicator 1: real GDP growth (change, yy)
Indicator 2: inflation (change, yy)
Indicator 3: exports growth (yy)
Indicator 4: change in reserves (qq)
Indicator 5: change in imports-to-reserves (qq)
Indicator 6: fiscal balance to GDP (change qq)
Indicator 7: interest rate
Indicator 8: external debt to GDP (change, qq)
Indicator 9: current account to GDP
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a correct signal for almost 80% of the crises, and it fails to signal only 22.7% of the
crises. The probability of a false alarm is high (48.7%). When the quarterly change
in the external debt to GDP is greater than −0.10 σ , there is an increased probability
of a currency crisis in the following 1–4 quarters. Since all data are standardized, the
threshold can be expressed simply as −0.10. Similar, a currency crisis is more likely
when the current account to GDP is less than −0.10, when the quarterly change in the
imports to reserves ratio is greater than 0.20, the quarterly change in the fiscal bal-
ance to GDP is smaller than −0.10, and the quarterly change in the official reserves
is less than 0.10. The other indicators work less well, reflected by higher TME
values.
4.2 Out-of-Sample Performance
We compare the performance of using indicator forecasts versus current-vintage data
in the predictions. We use the thresholds that were estimated in the in-sample period
to predict crises in the out-of-sample period 2011Q1–2017Q4. The results are shown
in Table 5.
The results provide support to the main hypothesis of our paper, that the prediction
performance is better (lower TME and Noise-to-Signal ratio) when using current
vintage data rather than indicators forecasts. The quarterly change in the reserves is
the exception.
Table 11 in Appendix B shows the crisis predictions on the individual crisis level.7
As argued in Section 2.1, we assume that missed crises have a higher cost than
false alarms, and are therefore particularly interested in the performance of the two
alternative data sets (current vintage data and indicator forecasts) in currency crisis
episodes. Four indicators (real GDP growth, inflation, the change in reserves, and
external debt to GDP) predict all crises, both if current vintage data and indicator
forecasts are used. For the other indicators the current vintage data perform better
than indicator forecasts. For example, the indicator “change in imports-to-reserves”
misses out on only two crises when current vintage data is used, and it misses out
on four crises when indicator forecasts is used. We also observe that some indicators
do not pick up a crisis, neither with current vintage data nor with indicator forecasts.
The indicator “change in imports-to-reserves” does not pick up the Brazil 2015 crisis,
indicator “fiscal balance to GDP” does not pick up the Malaysia 2015 crisis, and the
interest rate does not pick up the Colombia 2015 crisis. We conclude that also on the
individual crisis level the current vintage data perform equal or better than indicator
forecasts.
4.3 Binary Logit Model
We estimate the binary logit model for the in-sample period (1991Q1–2010Q4) for
the pooled dataset for 15 countries (see Section 3). The dependent variable is the
7We only present the predictions in the crisis and not the predictions in tranquil periods. This implies that
we do not show correct non-crisis signals and false alarms.
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Table 5 Signal Approach: Out-of-sample results for nine indicators. Based on 15 countries, period
2011Q1 to 2017Q4
Indicators
1 2 3 4 5
Type of data CVD IFs CVD IFs CVD IFs CVD IFs CVD IFs
Threshold 0.1 0.1 −0.5 −0.5 −0.5 −0.5 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.2
A: True positive 39 39 39 39 37 31 39 39 34 27
B: False alarms 190 238 348 360 177 187 302 279 109 95
C: Missed crises 0 0 0 0 2 8 0 0 5 12
D: True negative 174 126 16 4 187 177 62 85 255 269
Prob type I (%) 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1 20.5 0.0 0.0 12.8 30.8
Prob type II (%) 52.2 65.4 95.6 98.9 48.6 51.4 83.0 76.6 29.9 26.1
TME (%) 52.2 65.4 95.6 98.9 53.8 71.9 83.0 76.6 42.8 56.9
Noise-to-Signal (%) 52.2 65.4 95.6 98.9 51.3 64.6 83.0 76.6 34.3 37.7
6 7 8 9
Type of data CVD IFs CVD IFs CVD IFs CVD IFs
Threshold −0.1 −0.1 −0.8 −0.8 −0.1 −0.1 −0.1 −0.1
A: True positive 32 27 35 32 39 39 39 37
B: False alarms 112 133 139 148 221 240 172 167
C: Missed crises 7 12 4 7 0 0 0 2
D: True negative 252 231 225 216 143 124 192 197
Prob type I (%) 17.9 30.8 10.3 17.9 0.0 0.0 0.0 5.1
Prob type II (%) 30.8 36.5 38.2 40.7 60.7 65.9 47.3 45.9
TME (%) 48.7 67.3 48.4 58.6 60.7 65.9 47.3 51.0
Noise-to-Signal (%) 37.5 52.8 42.6 49.6 60.7 65.9 47.3 48.4
CVD: Current-Vintage Data as available in October 2018
IFs: Indicator Forecasts compiled by Haver Analytics four quarters before
Indicator 1: real GDP growth (change, yy)
Indicator 2: inflation (change, yy)
Indicator 3: exports growth (yy)
Indicator 4: change in reserves (qq)
Indicator 5: change in imports-to-reserves (qq)
Indicator 6: fiscal balance to GDP (change qq)
Indicator 7: interest rate
Indicator 8: external debt to GDP (change, qq)
Indicator 9: current account to GDP
currency crisis dummy variable as defined in Section 3.1. We include all potentially
relevant variables, even when there is multicollinearity among variables. Under mul-
ticollinearity the estimates are unbiased and consistent, but the standard deviations
may be inflated. This does not affect the predictions. In addition, we include a
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Table 6 Binary logit regressions with currency crisis dummy as the dependent variable for 15 countries
using quarterly data from 1991Q1 to 2010Q4
Variables Coefficient Std. Error
real GDP growth: change (Q) 0.53** 0.22
Inflation −0.45 0.32
Exports growth (Q) −0.06 0.17
Reserves: change (Q) −0.42** 0.20
Imports to Reserves 0.28 0.26
Fiscal balance to GDP: change (A) −0.23 0.21
Interest rate: change (Q) 0.05 0.15
External debt to GDP: change (Q) 0.93*** 0.33
Current Account to GDP: change (A) −0.14 0.13
Cyclical component of domestic credit to GDP 0.70** 0.29
REER over/under valuation 1.63*** 0.49
Fed Fund Rate: change (Q) −0.42** 0.21
US real GDP growth: change (Q) −0.27 0.17
Asia dummy −0.55 0.38
CEE dummy −0.35 0.36
Constant −2.81*** 0.48
Log likelihood −251.612
McFadden pseudo R2 0.343
Adjusted McFadden pseudo R2 0.304
Total observations 1013
Observations of crisis run-up 128
Q: the change of the indicator vis-a´-vis the previous quarter
A: the change of the indicator vis-a´-vis the same quarter in the previous year
All variables in this in-sample estimation are current-vintage data
We use robust estimators
***,** denote significance at the 1 and 5% level, respectively
regional dummy to distinguish the three geographical regions. Based on the Hausman
test we employ fixed effects to account for unobserved heterogeneity and mitigate
endogeneity due to omitted variables bias. The outcomes of the logit model are shown
in Table 6.
To assess the performance of the model we convert the probability of a crisis into
a dummy variable which takes the value 1 if a signal is sent, and 0 otherwise. For
this conversion we set a threshold for the probability. The lower this threshold, the
more crisis signals are sent (including false alarms), and the higher the threshold,
the less crisis signals are sent (including missed crises). We show the results for four
thresholds in the in-sample period in Table 7. For all thresholds, the TME and NtS
are substantially lower than for the signal approach (Table 4), which implies that the
logit model performs better than the signal approach.
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Table 7 Logit model: in-sample
performance. Based on 15
countries, period 1991Q1 to
2010Q4
Threshold 0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
A: True Positive 128 124 121 114
B: False alarms 156 106 74 52
C: Missed crises 0 4 7 14
D: True negative 729 779 811 833
Prob type I (%) 0.0 3.1 5.5 10.9
Prob type II (%) 17.6 12.0 8.4 5.9
TME (%) 17.6 15.1 13.8 16.8
Noise-to-Signal (%) 17.6 12.4 8.8 6.6
4.4 Out-of-Sample Performance
We now turn to the performance in the out-of-sample period, by comparing the gen-
erated probabilities of a currency crisis with the actual outcome. We use the same
cut-off probabilities from the in-sample period and show the results in Table 8.
As in the in-sample exercise, the current-vintage data perform better (in terms of
lower TME) than the indicator forecasts for all cut-off probabilities. Additionally, the
logit model with a cut-off probability lower than 0.30 performs better out-of-sample
(in terms of lower TME) than the signal approach.
Outcomes for an alternative statistic for the performance of the predictions, the
Quadratic Probability Score, are presented in Table 9. Here we can observe that
current-vintage time data do not always perform better than indicator forecasts. In
particular for countries where no crisis took place (Brazil, Mexico and Czech Repub-
lic), the QPS for predictions based on indicator forecasts is lower than the QPS
for predictions based on current-vintage data, indicating that predictions based on
Table 8 Logit model: Out-of-sample performance. Based on 15 countries, period 2011Q1 to 2017Q4
Type of data CVD IFs CVD IFs CVD IFs CVD IFs
Threshold 0.15 0.15 0.20 0.20 0.25 0.25 0.30 0.30
A: True Positive 30 29 27 23 27 23 19 18
B: False alarms 71 62 52 43 35 32 26 26
C: Missed crises 5 6 8 12 8 12 16 17
D: True negative 290 299 309 318 326 329 335 335
Prob type I (%) 14.3 17.1 22.9 34.3 22.9 34.4 45.7 48.6
Prob type II (%) 19.7 17.2 14.4 11.9 9.7 8.94 7.2 7.2
TME (%) 34.0 34.3 37.3 46.2 32.6 43.1 52.9 55.8
Noise-to-Signal (%) 22.9 20.7 18.7 18.1 12.6 13.5 13.3 14.0
CVD: Current-Vintage Data as available in October 2018
IFs: Indicator Forecasts compiled by Haver Analytics four quarters before
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Table 9 Quadratic probability




All countries 0.16 0.18















Per region LA 0.28 0.35
Asia 0.07 0.06
CEE 0.14 0.15
Countries with crises 0.28 0.36
Countries without crises 0.06 0.04
CVD: Current-Vintage Data as
available in October 2018
IFs: Indicator Forecasts
compiled by Haver Analytics
The QPS score ranges between
0 and 2, where a lower score
where a lower score reflects a
better out-of-sample
performance
indicator forecasts are better. For countries where a currency crisis took place the
reverse holds: the QPS is lower for predictions based on current-vintage data than for
predictions based on indicator forecasts.
Appendix B shows the crisis predictions on the individual crisis level.8 The logit
model does not pick up the crises in Brazil 2015 and Malaysia 2015 neither with
current vintage data nor with indicator forecasts. The crises in 2015Q3 in Brazil and
Malaysia are not predicted by the logit model. These crises are also not predicted with
the signal approach with the imports-to-reserves, and fiscal balance to GDP, respec-
tively. The two crises have in common that the pre-crisis conditions were different
from earlier crises, in particular the uncertainty on necessary reforms, political scan-
dals, high levels of debt and the high dependence on commodities (including oil).
For all thresholds, the logit model based on current vintage data identifies the crisis
in Venezuela in 2013 where the indicator forecasts fails. For the highest threshold
(0.30), there are several differences. Both the Argentina 2014 crisis and the Venezuela
2013 crisis is picked up when using current vintage data, while the indicator forecasts
pick up the Ukraine 2014 crisis.
8The same comment applies as with the out-of-sample performance using the signal approach.
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5 Discussion
Our results from the signal approach and the logit model confirm that using cur-
rent vintage data outperforms the use of indicator forecasts in predicting crises, both
for the aggregate level as on the individual crisis basis. Predicting financial crises,
including currency crises, is notoriously hard, even in retrospect. Taking properly
account of the information that is available at the moment a researcher has to prepare
predictions, makes it even more difficult. For supervisors, who assume that the costs
of missed crises are higher than the costs associated with false alarms, this is not a
comforting finding, because current-vintage data is not available in time for making
genuine out-of-sample predictions. Supervisors may reconsider their loss function,
and vary the relative penalty of type I and type II errors in an approach as in Alessi
and Detken (2011).
We also find that the logit model performs consistently better than the signal
approach, both in-sample and out-of-sample. The signal approach takes into account
one indicator at the time. Currency crises are rarely triggered by one indicator that is
out of line, but rather when a number of indicators makes a country vulnerable. For
example, a country with a high current account deficit but a large amount of reserves,
high growth and a fiscal surplus would not be as vulnerable as a country that suffers
from a lower current account deficit, but faces a high fiscal deficit, low reserves, low
growth and a high external debt. Logit models do take into account several indicators
simultaneously, which functions better to estimate and predict currency crises for our
sample.
We used several criteria to determine thresholds. The threshold and the perfor-
mance depend to a large extent on the choice of these criteria. On the one hand, when
type I errors are considered more costly than type II errors, the Total Misspecifica-
tion Error is used, and the threshold tends to be lower to avoid missed crises although
at the cost of false alarms. On the other hand, when both error types are considered
equally costly, the Noise to Signal ratio is used. The threshold is higher to keep the
number of false alarms low, although at the cost of more missed crises.
6 Conclusion
In this paper we focus on the use of real-time data for early warning systems for
currency crises. EWSs have received many critiques, one of which is related to data
availability. The use of realized data for EWSs is unrealistic and not feasible in
practice, since these are not available when predictions are made.
We select fifteen emerging economies from three regions: Argentina, Brazil,
Colombia, Mexico and Venezuela from Latin America, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Russia and Ukraine from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the Asian
countries Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines and Thailand. These countries
form a more or less homogeneous sample in terms of size of the economy, compa-
rable economic history since the 1990s including financial crises, and switches in
exchange rate regimes. We analyze these countries in a pooled data set, covering the
period from 1991Q1 to 2017Q4.
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The signal approach is often used as EWS for currency crises. We apply this
method to nine indicators that are typically used in the currency crisis early warning
systems literature. We determine a threshold based on a criterion that avoids missed
crises (type I errors) more than false alarms (type II errors), as the costs for the first
are considered larger than the costs for the latter. In the out-of-sample period we
use these thresholds to identify crises. Comparison of current-vintage time data and
indicator forecasts shows that the latter perform worse in signalling crises. This con-
clusion also holds for logit models, which is the second EWS that we analyze. For
both the signal approach and the logit model the results are consistent at the aggregate
and individual crisis level.
We conclude that in standard EWSs current-vintage data perform better than
indicator forecasts in terms of predicting currency crises. In other words, based on
indicator forecasts a high number of crises will not be signaled in time. Some possible
explanations are that the indicator forecasts which are based on consensus expec-
tations (and hence are point forecasts) tend to smooth out extremes, and that the
realizations are more dramatic than predicted in the run-up to crises. Future research
will focus on investigating alternative EWSs and on exploiting more information
from the indicator forecasts, such as the disagreement among analysts, and the skew-
ness of the distribution of the forecasts by using density forecasts rather then point
forecasts .
Appendix A: Data
Table 10 Definitions and Sources
Indicator Definition Source IFs Source CVD
Real GDP GDP in local currency, in HA IFS (complemented by WEO)
growth constant prices; annual growth
Inflation Annual change in the consumer HA IFS (complemented by HA,
price inflation index RR2010 and WEO)
Exports value Annual change in value of HA IFS
exports of goods (USD)
Reserves International reserves HA IFS
(excluding gold), in billions
of USD
Imports to Calculation: imports / HA IFS
reserves ratio international reserves
Fiscal balance Fiscal balance as a % of GDP HA WEO and WDI
Short term interest rate Short term interest rate: HA IFS (money market rate,
market rate (9 countries), complemented by treasury bill
policy rate (6 countries) rate), BIS (policy rate)
External debt to External debt as a % of GDP HA HA and WEO
GDP
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Table 10 (continued)
Indicator Definition Source IFs Source CVD
Current Account Current Account balance, as % HA IFS, complemented by WEO
balance of GDP
US real GDP US GDP in USD, in constant HA IFS
growth prices; annual growth
Fed Funds US policy interest rate HA Fred
Target Rate
Domestic credit Cyclical component of domestic N/A Calculated with WDI and IFS data
credit to GDP
REER valuation Over/undervaluation of Real N/A Calculated with IFS data
Effective Exchange Rate
(vis-a`-vis USD, except CEE:
vis-a`-vis DEM/EUR)
CVD: Current-Vintage Data as available in October 2018
IFs: Indicator Forecasts compiled by Haver Analytics
Data sources:
IFS: International Finance Statistics. Quarterly frequency
WEO: World Economic Outlook. Annual frequency
WDI: World Development Indicators. Annual frequency
HA: Haver Analytics. Monthly frequency
BIS: Bank of International Settlements
RR2010: Reinhart and Rogoff, 2010
Fred: Federal Reserve Economic Data. St. Louis Fed
N/A: Not Available
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Appendix B: Out-of-sample results
Tables 11 and 12 only present the predictions in the crisis and not the predictions in
tranquil periods. This implies that we do not show correct non-crisis signals and false
alarms.
Table 11 Signal approach: Out-of-sample results for nine currency crises, period 2011Q1 to 2017Q4
Indicators
1 2 3 4 5
Country Crisis CVD IFs CVD IFs CVD IFs CVD IFs CVD IFs
Argentina 2014Q1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Argentina 2015Q4 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y
Brazil 2015Q3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N N
Colombia 2015Q3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N
Malaysia 2015Q3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Russia 2014Q4 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N
Ukraine 2014Q1 Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Venezuela 2011Q1 Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y N
Venezuela 2013Q1 Y Y Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
6 7 8 9
Country Crisis CVD IFs CVD IFs CVD IFs CVD IFs
Argentina 2014Q1 N Y Y Y Y Y Y N
Argentina 2015Q4 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Brazil 2015Q3 Y Y Y N Y Y Y Y
Colombia 2015Q3 Y Y N N Y Y Y Y
Malaysia 2015Q3 N N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Russia 2014Q4 Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ukraine 2014Q1 Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Venezuela 2011Q1 N Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Venezuela 2013Q1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
CVD: Current-Vintage Data as available in October 2018
IFs: Indicator Forecasts compiled by Haver Analytics four quarters before
Y: Crisis is picked up
N: Crisis is not picked up
Indicator 1: real GDP growth (change, yy)
Indicator 2: inflation (change, yy)
Indicator 3: exports growth (yy)
Indicator 4: change in reserves (qq)
Indicator 5: change in imports-to-reserves (qq)
Indicator 6: fiscal balance to GDP (change qq)
Indicator 7: interest rate
Indicator 8: external debt to GDP (change, qq)
Indicator 9: current account to GDP
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Table 12 Logit model: Out-of-sample results for nine currency crises, period 2011Q1 to 2017Q4
Threshold
0.15 0.20 0.25 0.30
Country Crisis CVD IFs CVD IFs CVD IFs CVD IFs
Argentina 2014Q1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y N
Argentina 2015Q4 Y Y Y Y Y Y N N
Brazil 2015Q3 N N N N N N N N
Colombia 2015Q3 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Malaysia 2015Q3 N N N N N N N N
Russia 2014Q4 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Ukraine 2014Q1 Y Y Y Y Y Y N Y
Venezuela 2011Q1 Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Venezuela 2013Q1 Y N Y N Y N Y N
CVD: Current-Vintage Data as available in October 2018
IFs: Indicator Forecasts compiled by Haver Analytics four quarters before
Y: Crisis is picked up
N: Crisis is not picked up
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